Since 9/11, terrorism has been an important subject of study within the political and social fields, having often been examined critically. However, empirical frameworks have been lacking within the study of terrorism. This paper aims to counter reductionist views of terrorism and provide a holistic analysis under the arch of a criminological ontological framework. This study tests the relevance of routine activity theory to terrorism, taking the specific case study of terrorism within Southeast Asia. Working with Interpol, terror attacks, and counter-terrorism operations were quantified to mathematically model Routine Activity Theory where I aimed to find predictive terror patterns. Using a time-series analysis of terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism operations, Deterrence Theory, Randomness Theory in targeting and Contagion theory will be tested. A comparative framework will be established between religious attacks and politically related ones. My research aims to disprove any discursive assumptions of terrorism through a quantitative empirical focus. Furthermore, it aims to find patterns within terrorism to learn how to better combat it.
Open Journal of Social Sciences target is someone likely to be attacked and a capable guardian is "someone who might intervene to stop or bear witness to any offense" (Crawford & Evans: p. 775) [8] . The time-space element of this activity suggests that the convergence of all the previous elements may be crucial in the prevention of crime. Sherman et al. notes however that it is difficult to make the distinction between a "criminogenic generator" and an "attractive receptor of crime" (1989: p. 46) [9] . Although this distinction has yet to be resolved, the application of Routine Activity Theory to terrorism could be proven extremely useful to the prevention of terror attacks.
Routine Activity has very rarely been applied to violent crime such as terrorism. It has indeed been more used in the analysis of theft or delinquency. For instance, Osgood and Anderson did a study on adolescent delinquency with over 4000 student participants (2004) [10] . They tested the hypothesis that time spent in unstructured and unsupervised environments with peers led to a higher rate of child delinquency. They concluded that unstructured socialization led to higher aggression. Demographic characteristics have indeed been heavily featured within Routine Activity Theory as independent variables leading to an assessment of probabilities. Drawing onto Felson and Cohen's work, Chamard argues that "the organization of daily life in communities affects the amount of crime by changing the amount of criminal opportunity; crime can thus increase or decrease without any alteration in the motivations of offenders" (2010: p. 212) [5] . The value, inertia, access, and visibility of the target of crime are factors in the suitability of the target (p. 213). Furthermore, new elements have been added to Routine Activity Theory by criminologists. Eck and Weisburd introduced the concept of the "place manager" who was responsible for guarding a place where crime could occur (1995) [11] .
Therefore, Routine Activity Theory focuses on the geographical and timely distribution of crime. Chamard concludes that "the significance of crime pattern theory is clear if one focuses on how settings create opportunities for crime" (p. 218). With criminological inclination taken as a given, the field of terror studies through the lens of Activity Routine Theory becomes simpler. Indeed, as mentioned previously, the major dilemmas explored within terrorism have been the causes of terrorism. The focus is therefore drawn on the act, rather than an ontological exploration. Therefore, I believe it is an innovative concept to test this theoretical framework to terrorism. This paper aims to study specific terror events occurring in space and time, involving specific people and/or objects. The concept of Routine Activity Theory is not new but it has very rarely been applied to terrorism, as well as draws in elements often overlooked by criminologists (Cohen & Felson 1979: p. 591 ). The interdependence between terrorist and targets may be fully explored using this theoretical framework. The situational theory has been applied by Weenink to terrorism with the aim to prevent attacks. He concludes that environment affects radicalization (2015) [12] . Engaging in the complex study of terrorism, however, C. L. P. Bigot DOI: 10.4236/jss.2017.512011 143 Open Journal of Social Sciences means that the application of Routine Activity Theory has some limits. Indeed, building an empirical study on terrorism is challenging due to the difficult access to the data. It is hard to access interviews of terrorists and thus, pinpointing individual motivations. Therefore, this study plans to explore targeting and deterrence more than the decision-making and motivations related to terrorists. To apply Routine Activity Theory, our focus will not be individualistic like past criminological studies. Indeed, terror attacks will be the primary variable analyzed.
There are three actors to the theory: capable offenders, guardians, and suitable targets. Within terrorism, the capable offenders are the terrorists. In this case, I
will not focus on the capability of offenders and their radicalization. This thesis assumes the capability of offenders through their affiliation with a terror group, but rather will test the influences of successful attacks on other attacks. Although guardians may be ordinary citizens (Cohen & Felson, 1979 : p. 590), this thesis will focus on the police and the military as the epitome of guardianship. I will indeed test out the theory of deterrence to see the effects of the presence or absence of guardianship on attacks. With the capable offender taken as a given (the terrorist), the guardians and suitable targets will be studied. The guardians are represented by counter-terrorism forces, and the suitable targets are individuals targeted by terror attacks.
A Quantitative Methodology
To collect terror data, I worked in collaboration with Interpol. The previous summer I had undertaken a two months internship at Interpol in their Singapore bureau. I assisted Mr. William Lippert, an intelligence criminal analyst, in the elaboration of the 2016 terror report. Every other year, Interpol publishes regional terror assessments based on the study of a 20-month-period. The 2016 terror report provided an updated view of the 2014 Fusion Taskforce Project Pacific [13] .
Interpol is an international organization focused on security and policing. The organization aims to share security-related information. Counter-terrorism strategies are part of Interpol's agenda. With the inauguration of their new headquarters in Singapore, Southeast Asia has also become a focus for the organization. The report's purpose was to raise awareness of the extent to which terror groups are increasingly transnational, to identify intelligence and information gaps that inhibit law enforcement's full comprehension of the terror threat in the Southeast Asia region, to identify the threat of Southeast Asian citizens or residents pose a terror threat to other parts of the world, and to identify potential measures that countries can take to prevent and reduce the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Interpol makes use of the Jane's IHS Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) database which provides detailed statistical analysis of terror incidents in Southeast Asia. The JTIC database is a comprehensive event-based database of incidents [15] . Cheong and Laundry further criticize this mediatized vision of terrorism that has essentialized terrorism (2012) [16] . They encourage alternative critical discourses to avoid the normalization of transmediated reality constructions. Indeed, discourses are important in the way I construct concepts. Meaning is constructed by discourses of events which leads to "widespread social understandings" of terrorism (Hodges, 2011: p. 5) [17] . The first aim of our study is therefore to portray an accurate representation of terrorism in Southeast Asia and to break any essentialist assumption.
Terrorism has often only been equated to Islamism in media discourses, meaning that terrorism has been reduced to extremist religious terrorism. Within this study, bringing the scope of political terrorism will dismantle those generalizations. Furthermore, Al-Qaida no longer plays a role in Southeast Asia after its dislocation after the killing of Osama bin Laden. The Islamic State, however, is the new leading Islamic organization. Therefore, this study aims to provide an updated analysis of religious terrorism in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, this study aims to assess how countries in Southeast Asia deal with terrorism. Smith associates effective government to effective counter-terrorism (2010). He gives the example of the failure of the Philippines dealing with grievances in the Mindanao region and Thailand failing to recognize Malay-Muslim militancy as poor governance (2010: p. 4). More information on how terrorism operates would, however, be useful to provide more effective counter-terrorism in the region. Thus, this study aims to provide a mathematical modeling to terrorism to have a better understanding of the underlying operational structures of terrorism.
The main framework used will be Routine Activity Theory. Can Routine Activity Theory be applied to terrorism? Does the absence of guardians influence the level of attacks? Can deterrence theory be applied to terrorism? Is random targeting applicable? Can contagion theory be applied to this regional focus? Are there relevant patterns within terrorism in Southeast Asia? We thus aim to answer all these questions within our study.
Targets & Tactics
In this section, I will be examining targets and tactics related to terror attacks using Routine Activity Theory. I aim to find recurring patterns to be able to see a routine emerging within terror attacks. In the first part of this section, I will be testing randomness theory. Then, I will be comparing political terrorism and religious terrorism to establish similarities and differences in terror strategies. Finally, I will take a deeper look at Routine Activity by modeling targeted objects and sectors in time to build a holistic longitudinal framework.
Randomness Theory or Routine Activity Theory?
Successful terrorist attacks are based on the existence of motivated offenders and of unprotected victims (Hesch & Pedahzur, 2004 : p. 486) [18] . In this section, I
would like to test the randomness hypothesis related to terror attacks. Random theory attests that because of the maximization of casualties, targeting is randomized and thus proportionally distributed in terms of target sectors and objects.
Contrary to randomness theory, Routine Activity Theory would hypothesize skewed data where there is a higher probability of terror attacks happening in Randomness theory is however refuted due to the high rate of terror attacks in urban environment and vulnerability based on gender and marital status, as well as proximity to populated public areas (p. 496).
With the terror attacks dataset, I will examine the targeted people, targeted sectors and assess the difference between urban/rural environments. I am unfortunately unable to assess victimization due to the unavailability of the information, but randomness theory may still be tested through tactics and targets.
Hesch and Pedahzur judge their study limited regionally with a focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thus a focus on Southeast Asia may provide new information and reconceptualization. With a large amount of political terrorism seen in Myanmar and Thailand, it is without surprise that Direct Fire Infantry is the most used tactic. Overall, with the descriptive of the frequencies, it seems that randomness is disproved as the data is always skewed towards one category. This correlates with the finding that 
Political Terrorism
In order to establish a comparative framework between religious and political terrorism, I have separated our dataset based on types of terrorism. With political terrorism often aiming for regime changes or having separatist agendas, I
want to test the hypothesis that political terrorism aims to target the government to make a statement.
The random theory appears disproved when examining large-scale results. Indeed, 60.6% of attacks were perpetrated as direct fire infantries. This may be explained as that political terror groups are often army factions of political sub-groups and parties. This is the case for instance of the New People's Army as a faction of the Philippines's communist party. These appear to be mostly happening in rural areas, explained by the open-field spaces that make it easier for military confrontations.
Although there seems to be a similar number of hoaxes, assassinations, fires, assaults, and ambushes, there was no significance detected analyzing those tactics exclusively. However, I also ran a test on hacking, hit and runs, landmines, narcotics, riots, robbery, rocket attacks and threat within the political terrorism data set, and they proved to hold an equal probability of existence (significance 0.608). Therefore, the tactical data seems to be skewed in favor of Direct Fire Infantry, but some similarities in probabilities of other tactics to be used are seen within political terrorism.
With Direct Fire Infantry as the main tactic, the target sector and people appear to be perfectly correlated within political terror attacks. Indeed, the most common target sectors are open-fields domestic military clashes (49.2%) and the most targeted people are soldiers (49.85%).
The null hypothesis for equal probabilities is rejected within the target sectors which appear completely unevenly spread out. Discounting civilians and soldiers, the randomness theory regarding targeting is however seen at a weak level with Government Member, Identity Groups and Police Forces (significance 0.109).
Therefore, I can argue that the findings are a little different than expected. 
Religious Terrorism
There is a strong normative academic focus within terror studies that Islamic terrorism targets mostly civilians. Ganor defines terrorism as "the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims" (2002) [20] . He emphasizes the focus of civilian targeting by stating that the brutality against the innocent is what produces fear.
Therefore, I would like to test this hypothesis with our religious terror attacks data. Furthermore, literature has also focused on the emphasis of a mass casualty of religious terrorism. Jackson says that the purpose of terrorist violence is to intimidate and terrify (2009) [21] . Thus, with civilians as the main targets, it seems the most likely sector would be busy civilian areas. Overall, the main theory to be tested within religious terrorism is the randomness one as mass casualty would imply random targeting. Does religious terrorism target randomly?
Not unlike political terrorism, the most used tactic is Direct Fire Infantry.
This might be surprising for the fact that the media has often focused on explosives as a religious terror tactic. However, this can be explained looking closer at the data with religious groups also having armed factions. For instance, on the Theory does not seem to be proven on the grand scale of the data, putting direct infantry aside, it still seems there is an equal probability of attacks revolving around kidnappings, explosives, and assassinations (including shootings and stabbings). The least used tactics are threats, fires, and ambushes where signific-
ance cannot be tested due to the small sample of the data using those tactics.
Similar to political terrorism, domestic military clashes appear to be the most common tactic. Overall, the target sectors are not evenly distributed, thus rejecting our initial based hypothesis conjecturing mass casualty on civilian-based sector within a randomized targeting framework.
Civilians have a higher probability to get targeted than with political terror- Therefore, it seems random theory can only be proven in the specific case of civilians being targeted, where the sectors of targets appear random. This could be explained by the mass casualty strategy. However, overall the data appears to be reconceptualizing discursive knowledge of terrorism. Moreover, Held states that there is a misconception often within the definitional discourse of terrorism about the killing of the innocent when she states that terrorism has targeted military entities (2004: p. 60) [22] . This is seen within political and religious terrorist attacks.
Routine Activity in Time
Overall, it seems our data not only contradicts Hesch and Pedahzur's findings In 2014, there seem to be regular peaks within 3 months periods ( Figure 1 ). This is however not the case in 2015 where the use of direct fire infantry is more linear. The growths of direct fire infantry, however, differ throughout the year.
Between January and February 2014, there is a 137.5% increase in the use of direct fire infantry within terrorism attacks. However, between August and September, there is only a 12% increase in its usage. Furthermore, the correlation in time is weakly significant with an overall slight negative correlation (r = 0.420).
This means that the use of direct fire infantry has a tendency to decline over With military clashes being the most common attacks, it is more interesting to study a physical sector. One of the significant sector attacks are vehicles with 110 attacks being recorded on vehicles. A different pattern is seen here with a more significant spread of attacks in the period studied ( Figure 3 ). With a chi-square test, an equal probability is found between months with a high significance of 0.908. This means that randomness theory can be positively tested examining vehicle attacks. This further means that there is an equal probability of getting an Figure 1 . Evolution of the use of direct fire infantry. Therefore, randomness theory has been overall disproved when it comes to terror patterns in Southeast Asia. Our data suggests routinized targeting with Direct Fire Infantry as the main tactic. Blurring Ganor's differentiation between guerrilla warfare factions targeting the military and terrorists targeting civilians, it appears that there is a heavy confrontation between state militaries and terror organization. This is the case for both religious and political terrorism. Civilians remain the main casualty with an equal probability of death with soldiers. With a clear image of targeting, I aim to push Routine Activity even further in its application to attacks. In the next section, I thus aim to examine contagion in time and space to see if there is an influential pattern within attacks.
Offenders & Contagion
Capable offenders plan and undertake terror attacks. In this section, I will be testing contagion effect regarding terror attacks in Southeast Asia. Contagion will be examined in time and space, first regionally and then locally. I aim to see if there are behavioral patterns of attacks based on previous occurrences of attacks.
Contagion Theory
This section will draw on Dugan and Lafree's rational study of plane hijacking I wish to study contagion in both time and space. I aim to establish if an increase in attacks in a region has an effect in a later time in a bordering region.
Contagion can thus be modeled through a correlation between increases in attacks between t and t + 1 between two regions. Therefore, with a series of attacks in region A (A t ) and a series of attacks in region B (B T ) a perfect contagion model is as follows: 
Regional Contagion
In order to test contagion theory at a regional level, I aim to model the evolution of attacks level in three countries that share a border. These are Myanmar, Thailand, and Malaysia. Z-scores are used to establish a comparative framework regarding the evolution of attacks. In order to test contagion, a rise in an attack in t for one country should lead to a rise of attack in t + 1 in another.
The evolution of attacks between Thailand and Myanmar appear overall positively correlated (Figure 4) . Arguably the only seeming occurrence of contagion is between April 2014 and June 2014 where a peak in Myanmar follows a peak in Thailand. Indeed, attacks doubled in Myanmar between April and May followed by attacks in Thailand having a 28% rise. The two peaks are thus not proportional, leading me the question their influential significance. The data from Malaysia is uneven and scattered compared to Thailand. No occurrences of clear contagion can be seen between these two countries.
The lack of contagion between Myanmar and Thailand can be explained by the high level of political terror events in both countries. Indeed, political groups are localized and thus often unrelated to each other. The extremely low level of attacks in Malaysia compared to the similar level of attacks in Myanmar and Thailand skews this comparative framework. Moreover, the further lack of Open Journal of Social Sciences 
Local Contagion
With the lack of connections between terror events in countries, it is therefore necessary to examine contagion at a more localized level. Mathematical modeling of contagion indicates that contagion theory is only seen at a localized level. No contagion effect can be observed at a regional level in Southeast Asia. This can be explained by the high prevalence of political terrorism with often state-focused goals. This means that the links between organizations are weak. Only within the same country, that a behavioral pattern of contagion can be seen in some regions. After seeing the effects of attacks on attacks, I aim to correlate CT operations with attacks. In the next section, I will thus be testing deterrence theory based on guardianship. 
Guardians & Deterrence
In this last section, I will examine the figure of the Capable Guardian. A correlation will be established between CT Operations and Attacks to test deterrence theory.
Terrorism and Deterrence
Deterrence in the context of the War on Terrorism has been heavy featuring in Almog concludes that the use of classical deterrence regarding the war on terror was a mistake, which is a "war in need of a cumulative strategy" with intelligence as the main tenant (15). Frey and Luechinger also look for an alternative to classic deterrence. They argue that heavy sanctions and policing, as well as the use of military forces, may not be as effective as a benevolence system (2007: p. 238) [24] . Within a rational choice framework, they aim to raise the "perceived cost With terrorism aiming at mass casualty, the concept of semi-formal guardianship does not apply to our case study. Therefore, guardians will only be considered in the formal sense, meaning military, intelligence or police forces. In this case, they are quantified within the CT Operations variable. Deterrence will be defined in as a "threat or action designed to increase adversary's perceived costs of engaging in a particular behavior" where the actions are the CT Operations and the behavior is undertaking terror attacks (Traher & Zagarcheva, 2005: p. 90) [26] . Dugan & Lafree state that 'the rational choice perspective predicts that the frequency of aerial hijackings will decrease if the probability of success is decreased, the perceived benefits are reduced, and the perceived costs are increased' (2005: p. 1034) [6] . This also applies to terrorism, where it is assumed that an increase in CT operations will reduce the perceived benefits of terrorism.
Modelling Deterrence
One of the tenants of Routine Activity Theory is the figure of capable guardian figure (Cohen & Felson, 1979: p. 589 ). Moreover, the absence of capable guardian factors in criminal behavior. Within that mindset, deterrence theory goes beyond the absence of guardianship. Indeed, it assumes a correlation between guardians and criminals, also known as the "motivated offenders" (ibid). Deterrence works within a variable of time. It assumes within a value t where criminal activity grows, then in t + 1 policing will also rise. Furthermore, in t + 2 the criminal activity should decrease proportionally or so as a result of the increase of policing activity.
I have modeled thus deterrence in the following pattern with x as policing event and y as criminal activity event (Figure 8 ).
This model can be easily critiqued however due to its perfect correlation. Indeed, often attacks do not equate perfectly instances of policing. Therefore, to model deterrence, a general correlation must be seen when policing grows over time, attacks drop.
Testing Deterrence in Southeast Asia
To test out deterrence I aim to cross-correlate two times series. Our first observation is the significant difference between the number of attacks and the number of CT operations which therefore suggests that a lack of guardianship does equate to a high prevalence of attacks ( Figure 9 ).
Running a Pearson Correlation test in SPSS indicates that there is no signifi-
cant correlation between the two series. However, a Pearson test does not take in considering the value of time between both series which limits the cross-correlation.
In order to establish a more accurate correlation, I ran both series in R. I With the high differences between attacks and CT operations, it is difficult to really compare the general evolution of both events between January 2014 and July 2015. In order to better assess deterrence, modeling the two series at a similar scale is needed through z-scores previously explained in the previous section.
As terrorist attacks. Indeed, in instances of deterrence, a 50% evolution in attacks causes CT Operations to double. However, the drops in attacks are not as significant as initial attack growths. Furthermore, deterrence seems only to apply for periods of 2 months. Therefore, deterrence is not a process causing long-term change. This is perhaps due to the constant change of policing levels in the region. Perhaps steadier policing would allow for a more concrete deterrence process to take place. I can conclude overall that deterrence occurrences are not significant. Therefore, our second and third hypotheses are rejected.
Political and Religious Deterrence
Although our overall analysis seems to indicate more of a positive correlation rather than a negative one, I now aim to test deterrence for political and religious terrorism. For political terrorism, as it is country specific, I have picked the group with the highest number of terror occurrences. This is the Thai-Malay insurgencies in Thailand. I use z-scores once again to determine a comparative framework between CT Operations and Attacks. From January 2014 to October 2014, it appears Hypothesis 1 related to Routine Activity Theory to be shown ( Figure 12 ). Indeed, a lowering of policing indicates a rise in attacks. This relates back to Cohen and Felson's theory of the Once again, the tenant of Routine Theory seems to hold with one CT Operation corresponding to 6.6 attacks. Compared to our political study case, however, it seems that religious terrorism is much more policed. This may be explained by the media attention given to religious extremism. For instance, the United
States has cooperated with Indonesia post-Bali bombings (Vaugh & co, 2009) [27].
CT operations and Attacks appear positively correlated ( Figure 13 ). Only one instance of moderate deterrence is seen from February 2015 to mid-March 2015.
Policing tripled when attacks decreased by two. This is one of the closest negative correlation found so far in our data between the increase in policing and the following decrease in attacks. However, yet again deterrence appears more as a one-off occurrence rather than a general trend. Moreover, policing must increase significantly for attacks to drop. The correlation is not proportional.
Therefore, the data shows that deterrence theory is not completely applicable counter-terror strategy. The huge discrepancy in frequencies of attacks and of CT Operations, however, limits our analysis as both datasets are not comparable in numbers. Perhaps an overall increase of CT Operations in the region would be beneficial to elaborating the model further.
Conclusions
Smith concludes that "terrorism is likely to remain persistent" in Southeast Asia but does not represent a major threat to the region (2010: p. 5) [28] . He further adds that the region has become better equipped at dealing with terrorism in the last decade. However, our dataset suggests that improvements could be made in clashes. Deterrence is more effective within political terrorism where the highest deterrence occurrences were recorded. However, the discrepancy between attacks and CT Operations limits deterrence testing as it lacks proportionality. Smith states that a deeper evaluation of terrorism in Southeast Asia requires more attention to transnational linkages (2010: p. 5). There is indeed a growing connectivity between the local and global. Further research into criminal network theory would allow for a better understanding of contagion, deterrence, and targeting. I see this study as a starting point to empirical research within terror studies and hope for further analysis to provide a deeper look into the inner structures of terrorism. Indeed, the identification of terror patterns as seen above will provide invaluable help to organizations such as Interpol to prevent and reduce terror violence.
